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FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT YAOUNDE 4314 ACTION SECSTATE INFO KINSHASA

LIBREVILLE 30 DEC 75

QUOTE

S E C R E T YAOUNDE 4314

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DEPT PLEASE PASS TO THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, CM, US

SUBJECT: ANGOLA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE'S DISCUSSION WITH
AHIDJO

1. SUMMARY. DURING 55-MINUTE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT
AHIDJO, AT WHICH AMB SPIRO WAS ONLY OTHER ATTENDANT, HE
AGREED WITH MAIN THRUST OF US ANALYSIS BASED ON ASSISTANT
SECRETARY SCHAUFLE'S TALKING POINTS. HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT
LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING AN OAU CONSENSUS ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND
NATIONAL UNITY RESOLUTIONS, AND CRITICAL OF ALL FOREIGN
INTERFERENCE, INCLUDING US. SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION CAUSED
THE GURC SPECIAL EMBARRASSMENT, BUT HE CONSIDERED USE OF

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THIS ISSUE BY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE RECOGNIZED MPLA
MAINLY A PRETEXT. HE MADE QUALITATIVE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
SOVIET PRE-INDEPENDENCE AID TO MPLA AND POST-INDEPENDENCE

AID TO A MINORITY IN SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. AHIDJO REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO ANGOLA AS "GRAVE PROBLEM" FOR AFRICA AND WORLD. AHIDJO WAS MORE OUTSPOKEN AGAINST SOVIET INTERVENTION AND MPLA THAN WE EXPECTED HIM TO BE. CAMEROON MAY BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY ACTIVE THAN ANTICIPATED AT OAU MEETING, PROVIDING IT HAS SUITABLE COMPANY. END SUMMARY

2. IN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AHIDJO DECEMBER 30 ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TALKING POINTS EXPLAINED US POLICY AND VIEWS ON ANGOLA AND ACTION OAU COULD TAKE. HE STRESSED LACK OF SPECIAL US INTERESTS THERE, US RESPONSIBILITIES AS GLOBAL POWER, US DETERMINATION TO REMAIN INVOLVED IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATION PROCESS, US DESIRE FOR AFRICAN SOLUTION, NECESSITY TO BLOCK FURTHER AFRICAN RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA AND POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF OAU HANDLING OF ANGOLAN ISSUE.

3. AFTER ASSISTANT SECRETARY HAD PRESENTED US VIEWS, PRESIDENT AHIDJO STATED THAT US ANALYSIS OF ANGOLAN PROBLEM IS IN CONFORMITY WITH HIS OWN. THE SITUATION WAS REGRETTABLE, AND FURTHER COMPLICATED BY FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE BY SOUTH AFRICA, CUBA, THE RUSSIANS, AND THE UNITED STATES (IN THAT ORDER). THE PROBLEM WAS GRAVE FOR ANGOLA, WITH EQUALLY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND FOR ALL OF AFRICA. IT WAS INDEED A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE INVOLVING THEMSELVES IN AFRICA IN FORCE AFTER THEIR ERALIRE EFFORTS TO GAIN INFLUENCE PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL. AHIDJO SEES A DISTINCT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RUSSIAN HELP TO THE MPLA BEFORE AND AFTER ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE. POST-INDEPENDENCE HELP IS TO A MINORITY FACTION, OR A MINORITY GOVERNMENT IN AN INDEPENDENT STATE. AHIDJO THEN REPEATED THAT IT WAS A GRAVE PROBLEM WITHOUT PRECEDENT.

4. THE PRESIDENT STATED FRANKLY THAT CAMEROON WAS EMBARRASSED: BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, THE GURC HAD HELPED ALL THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. THIS HAD CONTINUED UNTIL THREE DAYS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, WHEN THE GURC CALLED FOR A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION. AHIDJO PERSONALLY HAD NO PREFERENCE AMONG THE THREE, BUT AS A RESULT OF THE FOREIGN INTERVENTION HIS SYMPATHIES
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ARE WITH THOSE AGAINST WHOM THIS INTERVENTION TAKES PLACE. HE PREFERS DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO RESORTING TO FORCE. THE MPLA WITH RUSSO-CUBAN SUPPORT IS TRYING TO WIN TERRITORY IN ORDER TO CREATE A FAIT ACCOMPLI SO THAT ALL THE OAU RESOLUTIONS WILL BE WORTHLESS. HE AGREED THAT MAINTAINING THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND WAS NECESSARY IF REAL NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO TAKE PLACE. AHIDJO SAID THAT ONLY THE US HAS THE MEANS, AMONG ALL WESTERN STATES, TO RESIST THE MPLA WITH THEIR RUSSIAN AND CUBAN SUPPORT.

5. CAMEROONIAN EMBARRASSMENT DERIVES FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CAUSES. THE SENATE'S ACTION HAS RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT

US DETERMINATION AMONG MANY AFRICANS, AND THESE DOUBTS ARE BEING EXPLOITED BY FRIENDS OF THE COMMUNISTS, WHO ALSO ALLEGE THAT THE US IS AFTER THE RICHES OF ANGOLA. HE KNOWS THIS IS NOT TRUE. BUT COUNTRIES LIKE MALI, GUINEA, AND TANZANIA PROPAGATE AND FOLLOW THIS LINE. THEY ALSO SAY THAT IN TERMS OF US-SOVIET COMPETITION, THE ANGOLAN AFFAIR DOES NOT AMOUNT TO MUCH. FOR THE CAMEROON PUBLIC, THE ACTIONS OF CONGRESS AND THE ROLES PLAYED BY OTHERS LIKE FRANCE ARE CONFUSING. WHILE THE PROBLEM IS VERY GRAVE, THE SITUATION, IN AHIDJO'S OPINION, IS NOT AT ALL LIKE VIETNAM, BUT RATHER A PART OF PRESENT WORLD POLITICS (POLITIQUE MONDIALE) AND SHOULD BE VIEWED IN TERMS OF BREZHNEV'S RECENT REASSERTION OF THE CONTINUATION OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE DURING THE PERIOD OF DETENTE.

6. THE PROBLEM IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION. THE PRESIDENT, IN CONFIDENCE, LIKENED SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF FNLA/UNITA TO AFRICAN FABLE WHICH TEACHES THAT IN A VITAL MATTER ONE MUST BE PREPARED TO USE AN OTHERWISE NEUTRAL ENEMY TO SAVE HIS OWN LIFE. TAKE APARTHEID AWAY, AND THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS HAVE NO MORE RIGHT THAN THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO INTERVENE. CERTAIN STATES, IN GOOD OR IN BAD FAITH, USED SOUTH AFRICA AS THEIR REASON FOR RECOGNIZING THE MPLA. AHIDJO THINKS IN MOST CASES THIS IS PRETEXT AND A SOP TO DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION. HE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS IS TRUE OF NIGERIA, BUT HE SEEMED TO SUSPECT IT. SIMILARLY, OF CHANA. HE EXPECTS ETHIOPIA TO RECOGNIZE THE MPLA SOON, BUT PROBABLY NOT UNTIL AFTER THE OAU MEETING, USING THE SAME PRETEXT. THE FACT THAT A GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE MPLA GIVES A CLEAR INDICATION OF ITS IDEOLOGICAL POSITION, AS HAS BEEN EVIDENT FOR SOME WEEKSQM

7. THE PRESIDENT IS SENDING HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO ADDIS FOR
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THE OAU MEETING. ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION IN FAVOR OF RECONCILIATION AND AGAINST ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION WILL BE USEFUL ONLY IF (1) THE MPLA HAS NOT ALREADY ACQUIRED MORE TERRITORY BY THEN AND (2) IF A MAJORITY OF OAU MEMBERS HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED THE MPLA. UNLESS THESE TWO CONDITIONS ARE MET, NO RESOLUTIONS WILL BE ANY GOOD.

8. THE GURC DELEGATION TO THE OAU WILL GET PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS AGAINST ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION, INCLUDING CUBAN, RUSSIAN, US, ETC. ON THE GLOBAL PLANE, AND THE DIPLOMATIC PLANE, AHIDJO CONSIDERED THIS A DEFENSIBLE POSITION. THIS WAS AN AFRICAN AFFAIR. BUT HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT A MAJORITY OF OAU MEMBERS MIGHT HAVE RECOGNIZED THE MPLA BY THE TIME OF THE MEETING IN JANUARY, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE AGGRESSIVE AGITATION BY ACTIVIST CHEIFS OF STATE LIKE THE PRESIDENTS OF GUINEA, ALGERIA, MALI.

9. ABOVE UNINTERRUPTED EXPOSITION BY AHIDJO, COMBINED WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S BRIEFER INTRODUCTION, TOOK TOTAL OF THIRTY-

FIVE MINUTES. REMAINING TWENTY MINUTES OF CONVERSATION CONSISTED OF AHIDJO'S RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY. AHIDJO MADE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GURC AND OTHERS' REACTIONS TO A COUP D'ETAT, WHICH IS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR, AND OUTSIDE INTERVENTION AS IN ANGOLA, WHICH IS QUITE ANOTHER MATTER. ZAIRE SUPPORTED THE FNLA FOR YEARS, AND ZAMBIA GAVE SUPPORT (PRESUMABLY TO UNITA), BUT SOVIET POST-INDEPENDENCE SUPPORT TO THE MINORITY MPLA WAS DIFFERENT.

10. IN RESPONSE TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S QUESTION ABOUT COORDINATION AMONG SYMPATHETIC AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS, AHIDJO STATED THAT HE RECOGNIZED COORDINATION AS INDISPENSABLE, SUGGESTING THAT IT WAS TAKING PLACE. HE AGREED THAT THEOSE STATES WHICH SHARED HIS VIEWS WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO STICK IT OUT UNTIL THE END AGAINST THE DEMAGOGUERY OF THE PRO-MPLA COUNTRIES. HOWEVER AHIDJO EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD ATTEND OAU SUMMIT.

11. HE BELIEVES THAT NIGERIA IS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA. IF THE OAU FAILS TO ACHIEVE A WORKABLE RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS, HE WOULD FAVOR TAKING IT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, WHERE THE FOUR OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD BE ALIGNED AGAINST THE
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SOVIETS. HE WOULD EXPECT NO GREAT AFRICAN REACTION AGAINST TAKING IT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR AGAINST THE OTHER FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS.

12. AHIDJO AGREED WITH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY THAT MAINTENANCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS CARRIED BENEFITS FOR ALL OTHERS.

13. HE AVERTED TO CAMEROON'S HISTORY OF INSURGENCY AND MENTIONED THAT OPPONENTS OF THE GURC WERE TRAINING IN CONGO (B) WITH COMMUNIST SUPPORT. THE RUSSIANS WILL EVENTUALLY DEMAND PAY FOR ANY HELP THEY ARE GIVING ANYWHERE, THOUGH THEIR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WAS NEGLIGIBLE.

14. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT PUBLIC INTEREST IN ANGOLA AMONG CAMEROONIANS, THE PRESIDENT SPOKE OF SOME PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY IN TOWN ON BEHALF OF THE MPLA, BUT HE DID NOT SEEM WORRIED ABOUT IT.

COMMENT. AHIDJO WAS SURPRISINGLY FORTHCOMING AND BLUNT IN HIS ANALYSIS OF ANGOLAN SITUATION WHICH LARGELY COINCIDES WITH OUR OWN. HE MAINTAINED HIS NEUTRALITY BY ADDING US TO LIST OF THOSE INTERVENING IN ANGOLA BUT ALSO STATED ONLY US COULD BALANCE SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION THERE. IF HIS ASSURANCES ARE BACKED UP BY THE ACTIVITIES OF HIS DELEGATION, CAMEROON CAN BE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW ITS STRICTLY NEUTRAL POLICY AMONG THE THREE MOVEMENTS AND PUSH FOR OAU POSITION SUPPORTING NEGOTIATED

SETTLEMENT. AS IN GABON ONE DISTURBING ELEMENT IS LIKELIHOOD
THAT AHIDJO WILL ALSO NOT ATTEND SUMMIT. I WILL PUSH THIS ASPECT
HARD IN TALKS WITH HOUPHOUET AND SENGHOR. I HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED
IN ANOTHER TELEGRAM TO DEPT THAT A NUDGE IN THIS DIRECTION BE
INCLUDED IN POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO SELECTED AFRICAN CHIEFS
OF STATE.
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